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ABSTRACT 
This report provides a perspective on the role of tender offers in cor- 
porate mergers and acquisitions and on the nature of financing used to carry 
them out. Analyzing SEC data on corporate takeovers, it classifies by in- 
dustry those firms for which tender offers were made in 1979 and 1980 and 
examines the sources of funds used in these acquisition bids. Comparing SEC 
data with information compiled by FTC and others, it assesses the importance 
of tender offers in overall merger and acquisition activity. The report fo- 
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CORPORATE MERGERS THROUGH TENDER OFFERS: 
MEASUREMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Large corporate takeovers receive active media coverage, and 1981 is likely 
to be a record-breaking year, featuring the acquisition of Conoco, Inc. by the 
DuPont Co. for approximately $8.8 billion. L/ Other multi-billion dollar mer- 
gers also made headlines in 1981, due in part to tender offer publicity. Re- 
cause of the size of these mergers, and because some of them involved foreign 
control of U.S. companies, merger activity has been a subject of increasing in- 
terest to the 97th Congress. 
Merger-related considerations in the 97th Congress have, for the most part, 
been concerned with the credit used to finance takeovers and foreign acquisition 
of U.S. companies; other interests include the size of takeovers and the nature 
of the affected industries. This report focuses on the record of successful and 
partially successful corporate acquisitions through the use of tender offers for 
the years 1979 and 1980. The two-year record has been summarized and analyzed 
by industry and by source of financing; other data provide a preliminary view 
of the pace of merger activity in 1981. 
The basic data used in this report were gathered from tender offer filings 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A tender offer refers to 
11 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional 
~ergers and Acquisitions in the Natural Resources 
tories and Financial Profiles. Report No. 81-205 
August 21, 1981. 
Research Service. Selected 
Industry, 1981: Case His- 
E, by Jeffrey P. Brown. 
any effort to purchase at least five percent of the outstanding shares of a 
publicly traded securities issue. When the goal of the entity acquiring shares 
is control of the targeted company, a 14-D disclosure statement must be filed 
with the SEC. The information required in these filings includes the industry 
classification of the company to be acquired and the source of funds used to 
finance the acquisition; information from these filings provided the basis for 
the data in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this report. 
For the industry classifications, the SEC filings provide information on a 
four-digit basis, using the standard industrial classification (SIC) code, for 
the companies being acquired. For the tables in this report, these data were 
aggregated to a two-digit SIC code basis. This aggregation loses some of the 
detail present in the SEC filings, but has the advantage of providing a more 
compact view of the industries involved in corporate takeover bids. Since every 
targeted company is listed under only one SIC code, this single classification 
is misleadingly simple for some companies, e.g. when an acquired firm owns sub- 
sidiaries which would fall under a different SIC code that is not shown in the 
SEC filings. This omission would be unimportant in the case of most small com- 
panies, but when the targeted company is a relatively large multi-product firm, 
using a single SIC code may distort the aggregated industry data included in 
this report. 
The source of funds used in takeover bids is presented in Table 3. Aside 
from the reporting requirements, the credit used to finance corporate acquisi- 
tions is not regulated by the government with one exception. Government regu- 
lations apply only when the funds used for takeovers meet the following cri- 
teria: 1) the funds must be borrowed from a financial institution; 2) the 
loan must utilize as collateral certain securities defined by the SEC, i.e. the 
loan is secured by particular debt or equity issues; and 3) the borrowed funds 
must be used to purchase shares of the target company (in regulatory parlance, 
the loan is "purpose credit"). 
In some instances, the SEC tabulations did not include data on source of 
financing and/or the total estimated cost of the acquisition. Where possible, 
estimates for these categories were obtained from the Austin Data Bank compiled 
by Professor Douglas V. Austin, Chairman of the Department of Finance, College 
of Business Administration, University of Toledo, Ohio. The summary calcula- 
tions used in producing Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 were performed by CRS staff. 
A tender offer is a bid for securities made directly to the shareholders 
of the target company. The offer can be made with the support of the target 
company's management (a friendly offer), but it can also be made in the face of 
opposition from the target company's management (an unfriendly or hostile offer). 
In most cases, the shareholders of the target company are offered a premium 
substantially above the current market price of the shares they own; primarily 
for this reason, most tender offers have been successful. 

11. PROFILE OF TENDER OFFER TAKEOVERS 
A .  OVERVIEW 
Tender o f f e r s  a r e  u r i m a r i l y  a  phenomenon of t h e  l a s t  twenty y e a r s ;  i n  
a b s o l u t e  numbers t h e r e  have been r e l a t i v e l y  few t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i n  any one y e a r ,  
and ,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  Table  1 ,  t h e  growth p a t t e r n  ha s  been h i g h l y  e r r a t i c .  
Table 1 .  TOTAL NUMBER OF INTER-FIRM TENDER OFFERS - a /  
Year Number 
Percent  
Change Year Number 
Percent  
Change 
a /  A u s t i n ,  Douglas V .  Tender Offer  Update: 1978-1979. Mergers and Acquis i -  - 
t i o n s ,  v .  15 ,  n .  2 ,  Summer 1980. p .  14 f o r  1961-1978; d a t a  f o r  1979 and 1980 were 
compiled from t h e  unpublished Aus t in  Data Bank. The d a t a  a r e  f o r  a l l  t e n d e r  o f -  
f e r s  f o r  which t h e r e  was a  schedule  14-D f i l i n g  w i th  t h e  SEC; t h u s  t h e r e  i s  some 
d u p l i c a t i o n  i n  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  i nc lude  o r i g i n a l  and subsequent  o f f e r s  ( fol low-ups o r  
mop-ups); a l s o  inc luded  a r e  o f f e r s  which were withdrawn,  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  o r  n o t  com- 
p l e t e d  f o r  o t h e r  r e a s o n s ;  and f o r e i g n  o f f e r s .  Percent  c a l c u l a t i o n s  were made by  CRS. 
The c o s t  d a t a  f o r  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  d i s t o r -  
t i o n  over  t ime  s i n c e  a c a u i s i t i o n s  of one o r  a  few v e r y  l a r g e  f i r m s  can  make a  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  r eco rd  f o r  any one y e a r .  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  on 
a c q u i s i t i o n s  summarized i n  t h i s  paper should be done w i th  c a u t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  
t o t a l  and average  f i g u r e s  mask an enormous amount o f  v a r i a t i o n .  Aggrega t ing  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o s t  d a t a  i n t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y  and f i n a n c i n g  t a b l e s  which f o l l o w  
can  be  d e c e p t i v e ;  f o r  1979 and 1980, t h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o s t  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  b i d s  
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  companies ranged from $100,000 t o  $75O,OOO,OOO 
A s t u d y  o f  t h e  122 domest ic  a c q u i s i t i o n s  f o r  1979 and 1980 f o r  which c o s t  
e s t i m a t e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  i n d i c a t e s  a  p a t t e r n  o f  bunching a t  t h e  low end o f  t h e  
c o s t  spec t rum.  There were 38 b i d s  (31  pe rcen t  o f  t h e  t o t a l )  i n  which t h e  ac- 
q u i s i t i o n  c o s t  was $10 m i l l i o n  o r  l e s s ,  and an a d d i t i o n a l  38 c a s e s  i n  which t h e  
c o s t  ranged from j u s t  over  $10 m i l l i o n  t o  $50 m i l l i o n .  By c o n t r a s t ,  26 b i d s  
(21  pe rcen t  o f  t h e  t o t a l )  exceeded $100 m i l l i o n ,  and on ly  5  o f  t h e  122 t o t a l  
b i d s  were g r e a t e r  t han  $500 m i l l i o n .  Tender o f f e r s  i n  amounts much h i g h e r  than  
t h e  l i m i t s  i n  t h e s e  two y e a r s  have occur red  i n  1981 and i n  y e a r s  ~ r i o r  t o  1979; 
however, a  c a s u a l  s t u d y  of  t h e s e  pe r iods  sugges t s  t h a t  a  s i m i l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
p a t t e r n  p r e v a i l e d  i n  t h o s e  y e a r s ,  wi th  most o f  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  concen t r a t ed  
on r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  companies. 
The d a t a  i n  t a b l e s  2,  3 ,  4 ,  and 5 were compiled by CRS from case-by-case 
d e t a i l e d  workshee ts  provided by t h e  S e c u r i t y  and Exchange Commission's Direc- 
t o r a t e  of Economic and p o l i c y  Research.  The i n fo rma t ion  was ob t a ined  by t h e  
SEC from schedu le  14-D f i l i n g s ;  t h e s e  f i l i n g s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  by law whenever a  
takeover  b id  i s  made. The d a t a  recorded by t h e  SEC i n c l u d e  a l l  t akeover  b i d s  
which were e i t h e r  comple te ly  o r  p a r t i a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l .  An example of  a  p a r t i a l l y  
s u c c e s s f u l  bid would be an i n s t a n c e  when t h e  h idd ing  company d i d  no t  r e c e i v e  
t e n d e r s  f o r  a s  many of  t h e  t a r g e t  company's s h a r e s  a s  i t  had sought .  Fore ign  
b i d s  f o r  U.S. companies a r e  excluded from t h e  d a t a  i n  t a b l e s  2 ,  3 ,  and 4.  CRS 
has  no t  made any independent  e f f o r t  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  accuracy  o f  t h i s  i n fo rma t ion .  
B.  INDUSTRY PROFILE OF ACOUIRED FIRVS 
Tab le s  2  and 3  o r g a n i z e  and summarize t h e  d a t a  f o r  1979 and 1980 by i n -  
d u s t r y ,  number o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  t o t a l  e s t ima ted  c o s t ,  and t h e  average  c o s t  per  
t a k e o v e r .  The f i rms  were g r o u ~ e d  by i n d u s t r y  accord ing  t o  t h e  s t anda rd  indus-  
t r i a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  (SIC) code fo l lowing  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n  f r e q u e n t l y  
used by a n a l y s t s  i n  t h e  U.S. Department of  Commerce. - 2/ 
21 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of I n d u s t r i a l  Economics. 1981 
U .  S. y n d u s t r i a l  Outlook f o r  200 ~ n d u s t r i e s  wi th  P r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  1985. Washing- 
t o n ,  U.S. Govt.  P r i n t .  O f f . ,  Januarv  1981. p. x x i v ,  xxv. 
Tn tables 2 and 3, the relatively small number of firms is rather widely 
spread out even when aggregated on a two-digit SIC code basis. With only two 
years of data under consideration, it would not be possible to identify trends, 
or undertake any other type of time-series analysis. However, in observing 
these years in terms of patterns, two factors stand out: 
* There are some industries which offered no examples of successful 
takeovers in either year. Noticeable by their absence are any 
successful bids for mining companies, other than those engaged in 
oil and gas extraction; this may be due in part to the fact that 
many such companies are not independent publicly owned firms, i.e. 
they are privately held, and thus would not be the subject of tender 
offers; many other mining firms are subsidiaries of large integrated 
manufacturing companies. In the manufacturing sector, there were 
no takeovers of firms in the following industries: tobacco manu- 
factures, furniture and fixtures, paper and allied products, or 
motor vehicles and equipment. 
* The finance, insurance and real estate classification was the most 
active category in both 1979 and 1980 when measured either by the 
number of takeovers or the total cost of takeovers by industry 
classification. Combining the data for both years, the financial 
services sector accounted for over 25 percent of both the number of 
all takeovers, and the cost of all takeovers. The cost estimates 
for acquired firms mirrored the pattern demonstrated for all the 
industries, ranging from $300,000 to well over $700 million. 
Further observation of tables 1 and 2 indicates that in 1979 and 1980 
corporate takeovers were not concentrated in any particular industry, 
with the exception of financial services as noted above. The data also indi- 
cate that the majority of acquired companies were small. For the two 
years covered in tables 2 and 3, the role of successful tender offers, whether 
measured by the number of firms involved or by the dollar cost, appears 
relatively unimportant in the context of the overall U.S. economy. 
C. FINANCING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
Table 4 summarizes the information on sources of financing provided by the 
SEC for each successful domestic takeover in 1979 and 1980 by the origin of 
the funds used to complete the takeover. The legislation and regulations 
governing the reporting of these data are at times ambiguous and allow some 
flexibility in the way the information is provided. It is assumed that the 
corporations reporting these data comply with the appropriate laws and regu- 
lations to the best of their ability, but nonetheless there are shortfalls in 
the data which limit an analyst's ability to make unequivocal comments on the 
source of funds. One example, easily noticed in Table 4, is that for more than 
10 percent of the acquisitions data are lacking in the SEC records for cost 
estimates, source of funds, or both. 
Table 4. SOURCE OF FUNDS USED IN SUCCESSFUL TAKEOVER BIDS 
Number of Total Estimated 
Takeovers Cost 
(millions of $ )  
Total Bank Partcipation 4 4 4,009.32 c/ 
Unsecured bank loans 14 2,187.03 o/ 
Unsecured bank loans 
plus internal financing 23 1,447.99 a/ - . Secured bank loans (not 
purpose credit) 2 9.20 
Secured bank loans 
(purpose credit) 5 365.10 
Internal financing only 3 3 1,239.42 c/ - 
100 percent in exchange 
of shares 3 692.80 
External , non-bank financing 1 35.00 
Source of funds not avail- 
able 3 c / - 
Total 
a/ Excludes one takeover with no cost estimate. - 
b/ Excludes two takeovers with no cost estimate. - 
1980 
Number of Total Estimated 
Takeovers Cost 
(millions of $)  
2 6 758.02 a/ - 
7 145.36 
12 506.80 
5 48.26 a/ 
2 57.60 
2 7 3,259.12 b/ 
5 352.23 b/ - 
0 0.00 
4 312.00 &/ 
5 7 4,329.14 d/ 
c/ Excludes three takeovers with no cost estimate. - 
d/ Excludes five takeovers with no cost estimate. - 
e/ Excludes nine takeovers with no cost estimate. - 
Source: Compiled by CRS from information provided by the SEC. 
I n  ana lyz ing  t h e s e  d a t a  i n  terms of  t h e i r  c r e d i t  market  impac t ,  a t t e n t i o n  
should be pa id  t o  t h e  extremes of  t h e  spectrum: where t h e r e  i s  no d i r e c t  i m -  
pac t  on t h e  c r e d i t  ma rke t s ,  and where t h e  a c a u i s i t i o n s  involved  t h e  use  o f  
secured  l o a n s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Board of Governors  o f  t h e  
Fede ra l  Reserve System. A c ~ u i s i t i o n s  which were ach ieved  comple t e ly  through an 
exchange of  s h a r e s  of  t h e  companies involved accounted f o r  5.8 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
number of  t a k e o v e r s ,  and 10 .9  pe rcen t  of t h e  e s t ima ted  c o s t  o f  t akeove r s  f o r  
t h e s e  two y e a r s .  These t y p e s  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  mo t iva t ed  by a  
d e s i r e  t o  avoid any c a p i t a l  g a i n s  t a x  l i a b i l i t y ,  bu t  s i n c e  t h e y  i n v o l v e  no 
cash  t r a n s f e r  t h e y  have no d i r e c t  c r e d i t  market  e f f e c t s .  While t h e  f i l i n g  in -  
format ion  i s  sometimes ambiguous, i t  appears  t h a t  i n  about  t h e  same number of 
c a s e s  ( 5 . 1  pe rcen t  o f  t h e  t o t a l ) ,  bu t  w i th  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l e r  s h a r e  ( 4 . 4  
p e r c e n t )  of t h e  t o t a l  e s t ima ted  c o s t s ,  bank c r e d i t  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  
Fede ra l  Reserve Board was i nvo lved ,  a s  noted i n  Table  4  under  secured  bank 
l oans  (pu rpose  c r e d i t ) .  Thus, t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  of  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i nvo lved  cash  
b i d s  r a t h e r  than  t h e  exchange o f  s h a r e s ,  and were f i nanced  w i th  un regu l a t ed  
c r e d i t  o r  i n t e r n a l  funds .  
I n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i n g ,  e i t h e r  a lone  o r  i n  combinat ion w i th  bank l o a n s ,  ap- 
p e a r s  t o  be t h e  most f r e a u e n t l y  used sou rce  o f  funds .  However, t h i s  c a t e g o r y  
i s  t h e  most ambiguous of  a l l  those  noted i n  Table  4 .  This  i s  because  i t  i s  
conven t iona l  c o r p o r a t e  p r a c t i c e  t o  t r e a t  a l l  sou rce s  o f  funds  a s  f u n g i b l e ,  
i . e .  f i r m s  r ega rd  a l l  c r e d i t  a s  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e  and o r d i n a r i l y  do not  i d e n t i f y  
a v a i l a b l e  c r e d i t  by sou rce .  Corpora te  f i n a n c i a l  o f f i c e r s  a r e  f r e q u e n t  p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s  i n  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s ,  bo th  domest ic  and f o r e i g n ,  both longterm and s h o r t -  
t e rm,  and a s  bo th  bor rowers  and l e n d e r s .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t imes  when h igh  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r e p r e s e n t  h igh  c o r p o r a t e  borrowing c o s t s  o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  h i g h  
c o r p o r a t e  income f o r  funds n o t  immediately needed ,  c a r e f u l  a t t e n t i o n  i s  pa id  t o  
eve ry  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  minimize t h e  c o s t  of borrowing o r  maximize c o r p o r a t e  i n -  
come from c r e d i t  market  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Borrowing o r  l e n d i n g  on a v e r y  s h o r t  
term bas i s - -o f t en  ove rn igh t - - i s  a  common b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e .  3 /  I n  t h i s  m i l i e u ,  - 
i t  i s  o f t e n  imposs ib l e  f o r  a  company t o  be s p e c i f i c  about  i t s  sou rce  of  funds 
f o r  any pu rpose ,  i n c l u d i n g  c o r p o r a t e  a c q u i s i t i o n s .  I n  f a c t ,  i t  i s  no t  u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  a  company could s t a t e  i n  good f a i t h  t h a t  i t  was u s ing  i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i n ~  
f o r  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  when t h e  u l t i m a t e  sou rce  o f  funds  involved  c r e d i t  market  
borrowing.  Undoubtedly, t h e r e  could a l s o  he  c a s e s  where a c o r p o r a t i o n ,  t o t a l l y  
f r e e  of e x t e r n a l  d e b t ,  used r e t a i n e d  e a r n i n g s  o r  o t h e r  i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c e s  t o  
complete  an a c a u i s i t i o n .  Under c u r r e n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  from an a n a l y t i c  perspec-  
t i v e  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  f i nanc ing  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  t e r r a  i n c o g n i t a .  
While bank f i n a n c i n g  i s  c l e a r l y  a  popular  c r e d i t  v e h i c l e  t o  f i n a n c e  acqui -  
s i t i o n s ,  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  need no t  be domes t ic .  Borrowers t r y  t o  o b t a i n  c r e d i t  a t  
t h e  lowest  r a t e s  a v a i l a b l e ;  i n  t he  r e l a t i v e l y  r e s t r a i n e d  c r e d i t  market  c o n d i t i o n s  
of 1980, 26 t akeove r  b i d s  involved some bank p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  b u t  i n  f o u r  o f  t hose  
c a s e s  t h e  banks were no t  domici led i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  None of  t h e s e  f o r e i g n  
t e n d e r  o f f e r s  was e x c e p t i o n a l l y  l a r g e ,  b u t  t h e i r  p resence  i s  c o n c r e t e  ev idence  
t h a t  American f i rms  can and do use f o r e i g n  c r e d i t  t o  f i n a n c e  domest ic  t a k e o v e r s .  
The r o l e  o f  bank f i n a n c i n ~  changed d r a m a t i c a l l y  from 1979 t o  1980; t h e  
t o t a l  number of  t akeove r s  dropped 30 pe rcen t  from 1979 t o  1980, and a l l  forms 
o f  bank f i n a n c i n g  ( i n c l u d i n g  combined bank and i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i n g )  dropped from 
76 pe rcen t  o f  t o t a l  a c q u i s i t i o n  c o s t s  i n  1979 t o  on ly  18 p e r c e n t  i n  1980. S ince  
bank f i n a n c i n g  u s u a l l y  p l a y s  a  v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  c o r p o r a t e  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  
t h e  r eco rd  h igh  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1980 undoubted ly  dampened some 
c r e d i t  demand f o r  t akeover  funding .  However, i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  assume t h a t  
c r e d i t  supp ly  c o n d i t i o n s  probably  had a  more t e l l i n g  e f f e c t .  As p a r t  o f  a  
g e n e r a l  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  program, on March 14,  1980, t h e  Fede ra l  Reserve Board 
announced a  s e r i e s  of  v o l u n t a r y  c r e d i t  r e s t r a i n t s ,  bu t  i n  such a  way a s  t o  
3 1  W i t t e h o r t  , Suzanne. The F r a n t i c  New Pace of  Cash Vanagement . I n s t i -  - 
t u t i o n a l  I n v e s t o r ,  v .  15,  June 1981. 
v i r t u a l l y  a s s u r e  compliance by t h e  banking community. I n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h i s  new 
program of r e s t r a i n t ,  t h e  Federa l  Reserve Board s t a t e d ,  i n  p a r t ,  
No numer ica l  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  t y p e s  o f  c r e d i t  a r e  planned 
but  banks a r e  encouraged p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t a k e  t h e  fo l l owing  a c t i o n s :  
. . .Discourage  f i n a n c i n g  o f  c o r p o r a t e  t akeove r s  o r  mergers  and t h e  
r e t i r e m e n t  of  c o r p o r a t e  s t o c k ,  except  i n  t h o s e  l i m i t e d  i n s t a n c e s  i n  
which t h e r e  i s  a  c l e a r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  te rms  of  p roduc t ion  o r  
economic e f f i c i e n c y  commensurate wi th  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  l o a n .  - 4 /  
Developments so f a r  i n  1981 i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  been a  s t r o n g  r e s u r -  
gence i n  merger a c t i v i t y ,  w i th  bank f i n a n c i n g  once more p l ay ing  a  major  r o l e  i n  
funding  c o r p o r a t e  a c q u i s i t i o n s .  The d a t a  f o r  1979 and 1980 show t h a t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
tend t o  avoid r e g u l a t e d  c r e d i t  ( secured  bank l o a n s  u s ing  purpose c r e d i t )  when pos- 
s i b l e  and use un regu l a t ed  c r e d i t  sou rce s .  However, t h e  1980 expe r i ence  a l s o  
sugges t s  t h a t  under c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances  i t  may be p o s s i b l e  t o  r e s t r a i n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  use  o f  bank c r e d i t  t o  f i nance  c o r p o r a t e  t akeove r s  when t h a t  goa l  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  g e n e r a l  n a t i o n a l  economic p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s .  
D .  FOREIGN BIDS FOR U.S. COMPANIES 
Desp i t e  e x t e n s i v e  media coverage and concern  expressed  by t h e  Congress  and 
t h e  b u s i n e s s  community, t h e  a c t u a l  number o f  f o r e i g n  o f f e r s  f o r  U.S. companies 
was r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l  i n  1979, 1980, and t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1981. The r eco rd  was 
compiled u s ing  d a t a  from t h e  SEC's 14-I? f i l i n g s ;  i t  i s  summarized by  c o u n t r y  of  
f o r e i g n  b i d d e r  i n  Table  5 .  These d a t a  i n c l u d e  a l l  f o r e i g n  b i d s  f o r  U.S. f i r m s ,  
whether s u c c e s s f u l  o r  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  and i n  t h i s  way d i f f e r  s l i g h t l y  i n  com- 
p a r a b i l i t y  w i th  t h e  d a t a  i n  Tables  2,  3 ,  and 4.  Two Canandian o f f e r s  were 
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  
An a n a l y s i s  of t h e  case-by-case d e t a i l s  provided by t h e  SEC, a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
summary p re sen t ed  i n  Table  4 ,  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  fo l l owing  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f o r e i g n  
4 /  S p e c i a l  C r e d i t  R e s t r a i n t  Program. Federa l  Reserve B u l l e t i n .  Apr i l  - 
1980. p .  315. 
Bidding 
Country 
b i d s  f o r  U.S. companies d u r i n g  t h i s  pe r iod :  1 )  Canadian o f f e r s  tend t o  dominate  
t h o s e  of  o t h e r  f o r e i g n  e n t i t i e s ;  2) a lmost  eve ry  f o r e i g n  t ende r  o f f e r  was 
s u c c e s s f u l ;  3 )  t h e  b idd ing  companies r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  on bank financing--23 o f f e r s  
used some type  of  bank c r e d i t  t o  f i nance  t h e i r  t akeover  b i d s ,  wh i l e  14 i n d i c a t e d  
t hey  were r e l y i n g  on c o r p o r a t e  funds .  With one e x c e p t i o n ,  a l l  o f  t h e  bank c r e d i t  
was e s t a b l i s h e d  through unsecured l o a n s .  
Because t h e  number of  f o r e i g n  b i d s  f o r  U.S. companies was r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l ,  
no e f f o r t  was made by CRS t o  summarize them by  i n d u s t r y  of  a cqu i r ed  company o r  
by s o u r c e  of  f i n a n c i n g .  
Table  5 .  SOURCE AND COST OF FOREIGN TAKEOVER BIDS FOR U.S. COMPANIES 
1979 1980 1981( s ix  months) 





I r e l a n d  
Japan 
Nether lands  
Sweden 
Swi t ze r l and  
D e t a i l s  
u n a v a i l a b l e  
TOTAL 
Number M i l l i o n s  Percent  Number M i l l i o n s  Percent  Number  illi ions Percent  
0  f  0  f  Of 0  f  0  f  0  f  Of Of 0  f 
O f f e r s  D o l l a r s  T o t a l  O f f e r s  D o l l a r s  T o t a l  O f f e r s  D o l l a r s  To ta l  
a /  Cost e s t i m a t e  f o r  one b id  u n a v a i l a b l e  and no t  i n c l u d e d .  - 
Source : U .  S .  L i b r a r y  of  Congress.  Congress iona l  Research Se rv i ce .  A Con- 
g r e s s i o n a l  Handbook on U.S. M a t e r i a l s  Import Dependency/Vulnerability. Report 
t o  t h e  Subcommittee on Economic S t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  Committee on Banking, 
F inance ,  and Urban A f f a i r s ,  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  Committee p r i n t ,  97 th  
Cong., 1 s t  s e s s .  Washington, U . S .  Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  September 1981. p. 204. 
111. IMPORTANCE OF TENDER OFFERS IN TOTAL MERGER ACTIVITY 
A. DATA SOURCES 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions can be accomplished through other means 
than tender offers. For example, a firm may divest itself of a part of its 
business through a private sale to another corporate entity, new ventures may 
be started by existing corporations, or the directors and shareholders of two 
companies may agree to merge for what is perceived to be their mutual benefit. 
Thus, the entire universe of mergers and acquisitions is much larger than those 
acquisitions achieved through tender offers. The total number of actual mergers 
for any particular year depends, in part, on the criteria used to define mergers. 
The Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission published an annual 
report on mergers and acquisitions until 1981. In its final report 21, the FTC 
noted that acquisitions must have met the following criteria to be included in 
its listing: 
1. The FTC must have jurisdiction over the industry to which the 
acquired company belongs. 
This excludes commercial banks, transportation entities, 
such as railroads and airlines, and communication con- 
cerns, such as radio and television stations. 
2. The acquiring concern must acquire at least 10 percent of the 
acquired company's stock or assets. 
A 10 to 50 percent purchase is a partial acquisition. A 50.1 
percent and over purchase is a whole or full acquisition. 
3. The acquired company must be American. 
4 .  The acquired company must be an independent company, a subsidi- 
ary or division of another company, or a division of a subsidiary. 
51 U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Statistical Report on Mergers and Ac- 
quisitions 1979. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D.C., July 1981. p. 11. 
These criteria differ considerably from those that require the filing of a 14-D 
schedule with the SEC. It is not the purpose of this report to analyze or eval- 
uate these different reporting systems, but only to point out that the inclu- 
sions and exclusions in the two systems differ significantly. 
The FTC recorded a total of 1,214 completed mergers and acquisitions for 
1979; another source, using the SEC 14-D filings, showed a total of 118 tender 
offers in 1979. - 61 The FTC data are reported with a considerable lag, while 
the SEC data are available in detailed form at SEC offices within days of a 
tender offer announcement. 
The FTC data collection system is somewhat eclectic, relying on FTC pre- 
merger notification information, the financial press, and various financial 
reporting services. Similar information is reported, using similar sources, 
by private sector organizations; a frequently reported source of such infor- 
mation is W. T. Grim & Co. in Chicago. - 71 
Grimm & Co. believes "its merger data bank is considered to be the oldest 
and most extensive of its kind" and has noted that "for the first three quarters 
of 1981, completed or pending acquisitions having a purchase price of $100 mil- 
lion or more totaled 94, the same aggregate recorded for all of 1980. There 
were 66 such sizable deals during the first nine months of 1980." - 81 This same 
source has identified eight mergers valued at over $1 billion, for a total value 
of $24.3 billion during 1981's first three quarters. 
61 Austin, Douglas V. Austin Data Bank (unpublished); see page 5 of this - 
report. 
71 Merger Pace Showed Another Sharp Rise In the Third Quarter. The 
Wall Journal, October 21, 1981. p. 56. 
81 W. T. Grimrn & Co. Press release dated October 21, 1981 (emphasis 
in original). 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Interest and concern over merger trends appear to be waxing rather than 
waning in the 97th Congress. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce noted 
recently that: 
Margin requirement legislation addresses only a small part of 
the Committee's concerns. The Committee believes that additional 
legislative measures in the near future may be necessary to safe- 
guard the interests of U.S. companies and the U.S. economy. - 11/ 
To date, Congressional concern has focused on two principal areas: credit used 
to finance takeovers, and foreign takeovers of U.S. companies. 
B. CREDIT RESTRAINT 
The general concern expressed in the 97th Congress has involved a perceived 
relationship between high rates of interest and the allocation of bank credit 
to finance large corporate mergers. The following is an example of this concern. 
In the Committee's view the centralization of economic power now 
underway should be halted and the Federal Reserve Board should make it 
clear to the Nation's money center banks that using huge chunks of the 
Nation's available credit for corporate takeovers and other speculative 
purposes is not a productive use of available credit. The Federal Re- 
serve has many implied powers and no banker can ignore a clear signal 
from the Nation's central bank. It must use all its power and influ- 
ence to make sure the effects of monetary policy fall as evenly as 
possible on all sectors of the economy. 
There are those who would say that even moral suasion of this 
type is an unwarranted attempt by the government to affect the allo- 
cation of credit. In fact, whether it likes it or not, the govern- 
ment already profoundly affects the allocation of credit by its 
policies. The current rage of high interest rates is an inequitable 
distribution of credit to the large corporations and oil companies 
11/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Uniform 
~argiy~e~uirernents; report to acccompany H.R. 4145. September 30, 1981. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. (97th Cong., 1st sess., House Report 
No. 97-258). p. 6. 
who can afford to pay 20 percent and more for their money, and away 
from the small businessman and homeowner who cannot. 121 -
This sentiment is reflected in several Congressional resolutions recently in- 
troduced (S. Res. 211, H. Res. 227, H. Res. 228, H. Res. 238; also see 
H.R. 4409). 
Some aspects of the effect of the market mechanism on the allocation of 
credit have recently been studied by the Federal Reserve Board, dealing with 
the relatively deprived sectors. 13/ At this point, it appears that the Fed- -
era1 Reserve is not sympathetic to proposals for allocating credit. One recent 
report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted that for a period in the 
third quarter of 1981, bank loan commitments to finance takeovers of more than 
$40 billion led to actual lending by American banks of a maximum of $10 billion. 
For about the same time period, business loans by commercial banks were about 
$350 billion, while all commercial bank loans and investments were $1,300 bil- 
lion. Thus, "by themselves, these credit lines will not have a substantial 
impact on United States bank credit growth." 141 
While this report apparently dismisses the need to restrict credit for 
merger-related activity on empirical grounds, it also noted that it is not pos- 
sible to determine the net effect of such credit extensions on the banking sys- 
tem, financial markets or consumer spending. In one extreme example, it is 
possible that there would be no net effect; that is, that the credit would be 
121 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Af- 
fairs. Monetary Policy for 1981. Sixth Report by the Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs together with Additional, Minority, Supplemental, 
and Dissenting Views. 97th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., July 31, 1981. p. 8, 9. 
131 U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Impact 
of ~ i z  Rates on the Housing, Automobile, Agriculture, and Small Business 
Sectors. Staff study. September 1, 1981. 
141 The Financial Markets, Current Developments. Federal Reserve Bank 
of ~ e w ~ o r k  Quarterly Review, v. 6, no. 3, Autumn 1981. p. 29. 
immediately recycled to the lending banks by the recipients of the credit. Un- 
der other assumptions, it is possible that credit for other purposes would be 
restrained and/or there would be some upward pressure on interest rates. 
Because banks are not the only source of credit for corporations, it is 
likely that blocking the availability of domestic bank credit to finance mer- 
gers would only channel the demands of acquisition-minded corporations into 
other credit markets. 
C. FOREIGN TAKEOVERS 
In general, United States policy regarding foreign investment has been 
permissive and nondiscriminatory, granting "national treatment" to overseas 
ownership of domestic firms. The exception to this policy restrains foreign 
ownership in industries primarily where vital national interests are at stake. 
According to a recent U.S. Department of State summary, 
Federal law restricts foreign participation in U.S. enterprises 
associated with atomic energy, hydroelectric power, communications, air 
transport, coastal and inland water shipping, fishing, and development 
of federally owned lands and mineral resources. Under Defense Depart- 
ment regulations, foreigners generally are excluded from participation 
in, or access to, work by firms on classified defense contracts. 
In addition, many individual American states impose further re- 
strictions on foreign participation in banking, insurance, and land 
ownership. However, these must be consistent with U.S. treaty obli- 
gations. Finally, foreigners investing in the U.S. must comply with 
all of the various Federal, State, and local regulations, such as 
antitrust laws and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations 
which apply to both foreign and domestic investors. g/ 
In addition, the executive branch has established an inter-agency group, 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), charged 
with guarding against foreign investments which are not in the national in- 
terest. The ability of CFIUS to perform this function appeared questionable 
151 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Foreign Invest- 
ment in the U.S. Gist. December 1980. 
when, in July 1981, it asked the French government to delay the acquisition 
of an American firm (Texasgulf) by a state-owned French firm (~ocigt; 
Nationale Elf Aquitaine) and was promptly rebuffed. 161 The general effec- -
tiveness of CFIUS had been criticized earlier by the Congress. 171 -
Following the general policy of nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign 
investment, legislation in the 97th Congress has generally followed the path of 
assuring equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors. Such legislation 
includes bills which would apply uniform margin rules to secured borrowing in 
overseas credit markets to foreign investors bidding for U.S. companies (H.R. 
4145 181, S. 1436 19/), and bills to limit foreign investment in U.S. industries - - 
in cases where foreign governments do not extend reciprocal treatment to U.S. 
investors (H.R. 4186, H.R. 4225, S. 898 [ §  2381). 
As long as mergers continue to involve large companies, they will proba- 
bly continue to be a concern of the Congress. Currently, a new issue appears 
to be developing: concern over foreign government control over U.S. companies. 
According to one recent media report: 
161 Selected Mergers and Acquisitions in the Natural Resources Industry, -
1981: Case Histories and Financial Profiles. p. 23. 
171 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. The 
~ d e ~ u z ~  of the Federal Response to Foreign Investment in the United States; 
Report Together with Additional Views. August 1, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off. (96th Cong., 2d sess., House Report no. 96-1216.) 
181 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Uniform -
Margin Requirements; report to accompany H.R. 4145. September 30, 1981. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. (97th Cong., 1st sess. House Report No. 97- 
258). Also see U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 
The Role of Secured Bank Credit in Corporate Acquisitions. Report No. 81-186 E, 
by Kevin F. Winch. August 13, 1981. 
191 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
~f fairs. Subcommittee on Securities. Extension of Margin Requirements to 
Foreign Investors. Hearing, 97th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 1429 [and] S. 1436. 
July 8, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1981. 
Official Government policy is still to encourage foreign invest- 
ment, but Congress and some departments, especially the Defense De- 
partment, are starting to worry about the implications of the ownership 
of some high-technology American enterprises by foreign government- 
controlled companies. - 201 
The Administration has indicated that it intends to adhere to the long- 
standing national policy of equal treatment for resident and non-resident in- 
vestors, the "national treatment" policy for all investors. Nevertheless, 
while maintaining this nondiscriminatory policy, a spokesman for the Admini- 
stration recently indicated that it intends to take a "fresh look" at problem 
areas, especially with respect to foreign investment. This plan was described 
in recent congressional testimony by a representative of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury: 
A special Working Group on International Investment has been 
established to consider whether U.S. investment policies are fully 
appropriate in light of our domestic economic objectives. One of 
the issues that the Working Group is looking at rather closely is 
direct investments in the United States by foreign governments and 
government-owned entities. We are carefully considering the problems 
that might arise from such investments, the adequacy of the current 
mechanisms in responding to those problems, and possible modifications 
to existing mechanisms, including whether or not the mandate of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is suf- 
ficient. The Working Group will also consider a large number of other 
issues, including the adequacy of current U.S. statistics on interna- 
tional investments. 
Virtually all the Cabinet-level agencies are represented on the 
Working Group. This broad composition will ensure that the full spec- 
trum of national interests is brought to bear in consideration of in- 
dividual investment policy issues. In addition, the Group will seek 
the counsel of U.S. business and independent agencies, in particular 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion. 211 -
201 Clyde H. Farnsworth. Washington Watch: Foreign Ties of Companies. 
The NG York Times, October 26, 1981. p. D2. Also see Trudeau's Nationalism 
Spurs a Stern Response. Business Week, October 12, 1981. p. 44-45. 
211 Statement of the Honorable Marc E. Leland, Assistant Secretary of the 
~ r e a s u r ~  for International Affairs before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Con- 
sumer and Monetary Affairs, Committee on Government Operations, House of Repre- 
sentatives. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury News. September 23, 
1981. p. 3-4. 

V . CONCLUSIONS 
The material studied for this report indicates that the following sum- 
mary statements are valid for successful tender offers in 1979 and 1980: 
* The absolute number of mergers using tender offers was not large: 
81 bids for firms were fully or partially successful in 1979; a 
total of 1,214 mergers and acquisitions were reported by the FTC. 
Fifty-seven tender offers were successful in 1980. 
* There was a sizeable number of important tender offers in the 
financial services industry, but among other industries they were 
widely dispersed. 
* The majority of acquired companies were relatively small, although 
there were several cases in which the acquisition cost exceeded 
$500,000. 
* Almost all of the tender offers were cash bids, rather than offers 
to exchange shares of stock. 
* Few tender offers used regulated credit. Either directly or indi- 
rectly, bank financing was a common feature of most tender offers. 
* In some cases, the available data were incomplete or not usable 
for other reasons; this factor would support the position of those 
who argue in favor of more frequent and systematic monitoring of 
merger activity in the U.S. economy. 
* Foreign takeovers of U.S. companies were relatively few in number; 
however, there is growing concern over foreign government control of 
U.S. corporations. 

APPENDIX: LIMITATIONS OF SEC DATA 
The following comments are based on a study of the detailed listings pro- 
vided by the SEC. They are not intended to be critical of the disclosure re- 
quirements, which have been periodically reviewed and revised and are generally 
regarded as adequate at least for their intended purpose. Nor is any criticism 
intended of the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to 
the 14-D disclosure reports. The SEC staff has been helpful, cooperative, and 
generous with the use of its time in assisting with the preparation of this re- 
port. It appears that the majority of the shortcomings of these data are the 
result of inconsistencies between conventional business practice and the dis- 
closure requirements. For example, a company may be relatively vague about 
the source of credit used to finance a proposed acquisition because its ac- 
counting and other record keeping procedures are not organized toward that end; 
as a result, approximate or vague responses are sometimes the best good faith 
reply a company can make to the information required by the SEC. 
1. General Problems. In six cases, the SEC records were not available, and as 
a result no source of financing information was provided. It may be that these 
records were unavailable because they were being used by SEC staff for review, 
analysis, or for other purposes. In many cases, an acquiring company estab- 
lishes a subsidiary for the sole purpose of making a tender offer for another 
firm; when the information provided by the SEC lists only the subsidiary as the 
bidding firm, the identity of the acquiring firm may be obscured. 
2. Source of Funds Problems. The central problem associated with the source- 
of-funds data is the difficulty of identifying explicitlv the origin of the 
financing used to execute the tender offers. Ambiguity regarding the source of 
funds  may occu r  because  t h e  a c q u i r i n e  company, whi le  a s su red  o f  adequate  funds 
t o  complete  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  may n o t  have determined an a c t u a l  sou rce  of  f i -  
nanc ing  a t  t h e  t ime  of  f i l i n g .  I n  some c a s e s ,  t h e  i n fo rma t ion  provided f o r  
t he  sou rce  o f  f i n a n c i n g  i s  so ambiguous t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  u s e f u l  f o r  a n a l y s i s .  
When a  f i rm e i t h e r  exchanges s h a r e s  o r  u se s  e a u i t y  o r  deb t  f i nanc ing  i n  
t h e  c a p i t a l  ma rke t s  t o  fund a  t ende r  o f f e r ,  i t  i s  r e p o r t e d  a s  i n t e r n a l  f i nanc ing  
and t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  has  been followed i n  t h i s  r e p o r t .  I n t e r n a l  funds  may 
be s p e c i f i e d  a s  t h e  sou rce  of  f i n a n c i n g ,  but  p r e sen t ed  i n  such a  manner a s  t o  
be t o t a l l y  ambiguous from an a n a l y t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e .  Ref l e c t i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  
c o r p o r a t e  t r ea tmen t  of  a l l  c r e d i t  a s  f u n g i b l e ,  f i r m s  may c l a im  t o  be u s ing  i n -  
t e r n a l  f i n a n c i n g  w h i l e  c o n c u r r e n t l y  n o t i n g  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  funds  t o  be used 
had been p rev ious  1 y borrowed. 
I n  o n l y  f i v e  pe rcen t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  i s  t h e r e  even 
a  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  Fede ra l  Reserve margin r e g u l a t i o n s  might  app ly  t o  t h e  bank 
c r e d i t  used t o  f i n a n c e  a  takeover  b i d .  The o f f e r s  a r e  summarized i n  Table  4  
on t h e  l i n e  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  "secured bank l oans  (purpose  c r e d i t ) " .  However, i n  
no c a s e  d i d  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  company o f f e r  a  p o s i t i v e  r e p l y  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  ( i t e m  
10(d)  o f  t h e  14-D f i l i n g )  whether  t h e  margin r equ i r emen t s  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  
Exchange Act of 1934 app l i ed  t o  i t s  o f f e r .  
